The ideological relationship between the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) raises a fundamental question: can a movement credibly invoke Islamic principles while tolerating the use of its territory by a group conducting armed attacks against Muslims in a neighbouring country? A 179-page Pashto book titled Da Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama‘ah Aqeedah (The Creed of Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama‘ah), attributed to Afghan Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, offers a potentially significant theological framework for examining this contradiction. The religious principles reportedly discussed in the book provide a basis for assessing the TTP’s ideological claims, methods and justification of violence.
The argument is not merely political. It concerns the relationship between religious doctrine, armed resistance, the sanctity of Muslim life and the responsibilities of those who exercise authority. If the principles attributed to the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader are accepted as an authentic expression of the movement’s religious position, they invite serious scrutiny of the TTP’s conduct and of the Afghan Taliban’s response to its activities.
According to the cited passages on pages 131-132, the book emphasises restraint in taking up arms against Muslims and respect for their lives and property. These principles establish an important moral boundary: the use of religious language cannot, by itself, legitimise violence against other Muslims.
The TTP’s attacks inside Pakistan, including those targeting civilians and state personnel, therefore raise a direct question about the compatibility of its actions with these stated principles. The consequences of such violence extend beyond immediate casualties. Attacks undermine public security, inflict lasting harm on families and communities, and weaken the trust necessary for social and political stability.
A movement that claims religious legitimacy must explain how its operational methods conform to the religious principles it invokes. Where violence results in the deaths of Muslims, the burden of justification cannot be avoided by simply labelling the state or its representatives as adversaries.
The reported discussion on page 133 is equally relevant. It counsels against rebellion against a ruler, even in circumstances of injustice, except where obedience would entail disobedience to God. This principle raises difficult questions about the TTP’s armed campaign against the Pakistani state.
The issue is not whether governments are beyond criticism or whether grievances should be ignored. Governments can be criticised, institutions can require reform, and political disputes can demand serious resolution. The essential distinction, however, is between pursuing change through legitimate political and social processes and adopting violence as an instrument of coercion.
The TTP’s strategy of armed confrontation presents a challenge to the very idea of political and social order that such religious principles seek to protect. If the prohibition on rebellion is part of the Afghan Taliban’s stated theological position, the TTP’s armed campaign requires a coherent religious explanation rather than an assumption that its political objectives automatically confer legitimacy.
Another important issue concerns takfir, the practice of declaring another Muslim an unbeliever. The book reportedly cautions against declaring a Muslim a non-believer merely on the basis of sin, particularly in the passages on pages 108-109. Its discussion on pages 135-139 is also said to condemn sectarianism and disagreements that damage collective Muslim unity.
These principles are significant because the indiscriminate use of takfir can transform political disagreements into supposedly existential religious conflicts. Once opponents are portrayed as outside the faith, violence against them can be presented as religiously permissible, reducing the space for dialogue, restraint and reconciliation.
The TTP’s ideological positions and violent practices must therefore be assessed against these theological standards. Any rhetoric that delegitimises Muslims or state institutions through sweeping religious accusations raises questions about the consistency of the movement’s doctrinal claims. The principle of Muslim unity cannot be meaningfully upheld while violence and exclusion deepen divisions within Muslim societies.
The reported discussion on page 141 emphasises justice, trustworthiness and the avoidance of betrayal as religious obligations. These values provide another standard against which the conduct of armed organisations can be evaluated.
Justice is not simply a claim to be made by those seeking power. It requires conduct that respects the rights and dignity of others. Trustworthiness entails accountability for the consequences of one’s actions, while the prohibition of betrayal raises questions about the responsibilities that accompany religious and political commitments.
The TTP’s use of violence to advance its objectives sits uneasily with these principles when its actions inflict harm on communities and undermine public security. Religious identity and ideological affiliation cannot substitute for ethical accountability. A movement’s credibility ultimately depends on whether its conduct reflects the values it publicly professes.
The contradiction becomes more consequential when the Afghan Taliban’s relationship with the TTP is considered. The two movements share ideological affinities and historical connections, although they are distinct organisations with different operational environments and political objectives. The TTP has looked to the Afghan Taliban as an ideological model, making the latter’s public religious position particularly relevant to an assessment of the former’s claims.
Afghanistan’s territory must not be used as a base for attacks against Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban authorities have a responsibility to take credible and effective measures against TTP sanctuaries, operational networks and cross-border violence. This responsibility is both a matter of regional security and a test of the consistency between their religious declarations and their governing practices.
Failure to prevent attacks originating from Afghan territory would deepen the gap between professed principles and practical policy. Such concerns should be addressed through verifiable action, sustained engagement and effective security measures rather than rhetorical assurances alone. Pakistan’s security concerns also require a response grounded in evidence, accountability and measures that protect civilians on both sides of the border.
The book attributed to Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada could provide a useful point of reference for examining the TTP’s religious justification of violence. However, its authenticity, attribution and cited passages should be independently verified before they are presented as definitive evidence of the Afghan Taliban’s official position.
If verified, the principles discussed in the text would sharpen an important question: how can the TTP reconcile its armed campaign with respect for Muslim life, restraint in declaring fellow Muslims unbelievers, opposition to rebellion and the obligations of justice and trustworthiness?
The Afghan Taliban face a parallel test. If these principles represent their genuine religious position, they should be reflected in their policies towards the TTP. Preventing Afghan territory from being used for attacks against Pakistan would provide a concrete demonstration that religious commitments carry practical obligations.
The credibility of a religious movement cannot rest on doctrine alone. It must also be measured by its conduct. Where theological claims conflict with the realities of violence, the contradiction demands scrutiny. The TTP’s actions, and the Afghan Taliban’s response to them, will remain a test of whether religious principles are treated as binding obligations or invoked selectively to serve political and armed objectives.
