Shabbar Zaidi’s recent statement that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has undermined Pakistan’s economy, followed by his call to stop it altogether, ignores a basic fact: CPEC is not confined to the roads and power projects on which its critics have built their case. It has been entered a phase centered on industries, investment, technology, employment and exports.

By August 2026, 45 CPEC projects worth $25.61 billion had been completed across energy, infrastructure and socio-economic sectors. CPEC-related projects added more than 9,000 MW of electricity generation capacity, while major infrastructure, including the Multan-Sukkur Motorway and the Lahore Orange Line, became operational. The Multan-Sukkur Motorway reduced travel time between the two cities from around eight hours to 4.5 hours. These are not projections or political promises. They are assets already operating in Pakistan.

But the stronger answer to Zaidi’s claim lies in what comes next. The first phase of CPEC focused largely on energy and connectivity. CPEC 2.0 is structured around converting that physical foundation into wider economic activity through industrialization, business investment, technology and trade. This is the transition that Zaidi’s blanket prescription ignores.

Special Economic Zones are central to this shift. The original priority zones include Rashakai, Allama Iqbal Industrial City, Dhabeji, Bostan, Mirpur and the Gwadar Free Zone, while Rashakai, Allama Iqbal Industrial City, Dhabeji and Bostan have reached advanced stages of development. These zones provide a framework for investment in manufacturing, electronics, pharmaceuticals, textiles, food processing, engineering and logistics.

The focus is increasingly on encouraging Chinese companies and other investors to establish production and manufacturing facilities inside Pakistan. That changes the economic equation. Industries established in the country create jobs, require local suppliers and services, generate business activity and open avenues for technology transfer. As domestic production expands and becomes connected to external markets, it can strengthen supply chains and increase exports. This is precisely how infrastructure can be translated into wider economic activity.

The direction of CPEC 2.0 is further defined through its five thematic corridors, or 5Cs. The Growth Corridor centers on industrial and agricultural modernization and export-oriented production. The Innovation Corridor focuses on technology, digital connectivity and emerging sectors. The Livelihood Corridor links investment with employment, skills development and SMEs. The Green Corridor promotes renewable and sustainable development, while the Openness Corridor focuses on logistics, trade facilitation and stronger regional connectivity. Together, these five areas are designed to move CPEC beyond infrastructure and create a wider base for investment, production, jobs and trade.

Zaidi’s argument also falls apart if CPEC is treated as the source of Pakistan’s trade imbalance with China. A trade deficit alone does not prove that CPEC has undermined Pakistan’s economy. The relevant question is whether Pakistan can use the infrastructure, industrial zones and business partnerships created under CPEC to expand domestic manufacturing and develop higher-value exports. CPEC 2.0 directly focuses on manufacturing, agro-processing, industrial value chains and export-oriented enterprises.

The same applies to attempts to portray CPEC as the source of Pakistan’s entire debt burden. Chinese debt accounts for 26 per cent of Pakistan’s external public debt, alongside multilateral creditors, Paris Club lenders and commercial borrowing. CPEC financing itself includes concessional loans, equity investment and IPP-based structures. Reducing Pakistan’s broader debt position to CPEC is therefore not a serious reading of the financial picture.

For a former FBR chairman, Zaidi’s argument is remarkably thin. A recommendation to abandon a major economic and strategic framework should rest on financial calculations, project-wise analysis and a clear replacement strategy. Zaidi has not explained which projects should be stopped, what the cost of abandoning them would be or what Pakistan should put in place of the investment, industrial cooperation and regional connectivity now being developed.

Instead, he has offered a slogan.

CPEC should be assessed by outcomes, but any serious assessment must account for both what has already been delivered and the stage the project is now entering. Its first phase created energy and connectivity infrastructure. The second is focused on translating that foundation into industries, investment, technology, employment and exports through SEZs and the 5Cs.

Pakistan’s economic interest does not lie in discarding a framework that has already delivered operating assets and is now positioned for industrial expansion. It lies in extracting greater value from the infrastructure, partnerships and zones already in place, correcting underperformance where it exists, and ensuring that the next phase delivers jobs, technology and exports. Abandoning CPEC without evidence or an alternative is not a policy. It is a retreat from the very platform on which Pakistan’s next stage of productive growth is being built.